1. **INTRODUCTION**

**Standard assumption:** If the word $w_1$ in the language $L_1$ corresponds to the words $w_2$ and $w_3$ in the language $L_2$, then $w_1$ is in fact lexically ambiguous.

Example:

Beck 2000: differentiation of *different* in function of the licenser:

(1) a. Detmar and Kordula live in different cities. plural NP dependent reading
   b. Frank bought three different books. reciprocal reading

(2) a. Frank bought a different book. discourse anaphoric reading
   b. Every girl read a different book. universal NP dependent reading

Beck 2000: *different* is ambiguous between a relational adjective with a hidden reciprocal and a comparison operator.

Support: different lexical items in German – and in Dutch:

(4) a. Detmar en Kordula wonen in verschillende steden. relational
   b. Elk meisje las een ander boek. comparison

The discourse anaphoric reading and the universal NP dependent reading are allowed only with *ander*. A reciprocal interpretation and a plural NP dependent one are only possible with *verschillende*.

**Table 1: Different meanings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>interpretations</th>
<th>German and Dutch</th>
<th>German <em>verschieden</em> and Dutch <em>verschillende</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>discourse anaphoric</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>universal NP dependent</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reciprocal</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plural NP dependent</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comparative</td>
<td>relational adjective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Beck 2000: The discourse-anaphoric and the universal NP dependent readings (= *ander*) contain a comparison operator, while the reciprocal and the plural NP dependent ones (= *verschieden/verschillende*) contain a relational adjective with a hidden reciprocal.

However:

(4) a. Detmar and Kordula live in different cities.
   b. Frank bought three different books.

(4) a. Elk meisje las een ander boek.
   b. Every girl read a different book.

(4) a. Detmar en Kordula wonen in verschillende steden.
   b. Elk meisje las een ander boek.

(4) a. Frank bought a different book.
   b. Every girl read a different book.

**Same meanings:**

a. English: (a) property comparison vs. object comparison; (b) scalar vs. non-scalar; (c) the choice of the licenser

b. Russian: adjective (reciprocal property comparison only) vs. particle

How many meanings of *same* are there?
We will demonstrate that:

- English has only one *same*, Russian has two (reciprocal and “generic”)
- The English *same* can only be coerced into a reciprocal reading
- The Russian “generic” *same* is itself a result of coercion

Main claim: **lexicalization patterns in one language can shed no light on the other**

2. **IS IT ALL THE SAME?**

Carlson 1987, Moltmann 1992, etc., distinguish between the **deictic reading of same**, which has a contextual antecedent or is accompanied by a comparison clause (*same... as*) and the **internal reading of same**, which is dependent on a plural or a universal:

On the licensing of the internal reading see Dowty 1985, Carlson 1987, Moltmann 1992, Beck 2000, etc.

(5)  
   a. Alice bought the same book as Beth. **deictic**
   b. Alice bought *Neverwhere*. Beth bought the same book.

(6)  
   a. Alice and Beth bought the same book. **internal**
   b. Every girl bought the same book.

Barker to appear provides a lexical entry for the internal reading (and argues against unifying it with the deictic reading, despite the fact that it’s expressed by the same lexical item cross-linguistically). For him, *same* is a quantificational adjective:

(7)  
   \[
   \text{[same]} = \lambda F(\langle e, t \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle) \cdot \lambda X \cdot \exists f \forall x < X [[F(f)](x)]
   \]

   *f* is a choice function of the unusual type \(\langle e, t \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle\) and returns a singleton set (rather than an entity)

NB: The meaning in (7) is more complex than it need be, but that’s a topic for another time.

Because *same* is not interpretable in its base position, it must QR and adjoin to some node of the type \(\langle e, t \rangle\), leaving behind a trace of the type \(\langle e, t \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle\):

(8)  
   \[
   \text{DP} \quad \text{D}^0 \quad \text{two} \quad \text{xAP} \quad \text{NP} \quad \langle e, t \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle \\
   \text{NP} \quad \text{NP} \quad \langle e, t \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle \\
   \text{same} \quad \lambda g(\langle e, t \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle) \quad \text{NP} \quad \text{PP} \\
   \text{men} \quad \text{p}^0 \quad \text{with} \quad \text{DP} \\
   \text{the} \quad \text{xAP} \quad \text{NP} \\
   \text{with} \quad \text{the} \quad \text{xAP} \quad \text{NP} \\
   \text{name} \quad \text{NP}
   \]

The licensing of *same* and *different* is a result of the obligatory QR.

-Prediction: as *same* leaves behind a trace of the type \(\langle e, t \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle\), it is obligatorily attributive.

NB: The same prediction is made for *different*, though

This is consistent with the observation (Geach 1967, 1973, Gupta 1980, Moltmann 2006) that identity is relative:

(9) Suppose I have a statue in my study that one day I decide to melt and re-cast. On the next day, I can legitimately assert, pointing at my new masterpiece:
   a. It’s the same lump of metal.
   b. It’s not the same statue.
Moltmann 2006: In relative identity sentences, the noun co-occurring with *same* provides the sortal necessary to establish the identity conditions (details in section 5.3).

2.1. **Property comparison**

Alrenga 2006: The standard analysis of *different* and *same* in the terms of object comparison does not account for the fact that they are scalar:

(10) a. My new car is {a bit, quite, very, really} different from my previous one.
   b. Frozen fish is {almost, nearly, just about, not quite, roughly} the same as fresh fish.

Alrenga 2006: *same* and *different* are similarity predicates, in the same class as *like*:

(11) *My new car is the same as my previous one* is true in w iff $\forall P[P_w(n) \leftrightarrow P_w(p)]$

where n is *my new car* and p is *my previous car*; and contextual restriction is assumed

NB: For *different*, property comparison and object comparison are truth-conditionally indistinct – this is not true for *same*

Three possibilities:
   (i) *same* is ambiguous between property comparison and object comparison
   (ii) The object comparison reading of *same* is basic. The property comparison reading is derived/coerced from it in certain environments (e.g., in the predicate position)
   (iii) The property comparison reading of *same* is basic. The object comparison reading is derived/coerced from it in certain environments (e.g., in argument positions)

Empirical generalization: in English, the property comparison reading is directly available only in the post-copular position, where the object comparison reading is impossible:

(12) Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde are the same. ≠ $j=h$

Why?

2.1.1. **“Orphaned” same**

In the post-copular position, *same* need not be followed by an NP:

(13) These two analyses are the same.

The immediately obvious analysis involving NP-ellipsis has to be rejected – with an overt NP following *same*, the property comparison reading is not available (see also section 5.3):

(14) a. *Re-Birth* and *The Chrysalids* are the same book. × property comparison
   b. *All men are the same one/human being/personality…*

Proposal: (13) contains a null NP, which provides a set of all contextually relevant properties (a universal quantifier over properties):

(15) $\forall P_r [\exists X \forall x \in X \exists y [\text{ID}(y)(x) \land f(P)(y)]]$ (these two analyses)]

In other words these two analyses are indistinguishable with respect to all contextually salient properties, which entails Alrenga’s semantics for the property comparison *same*.

NB: As the analysis stands, P can range over properties corresponding to APs (and maybe even VPs); we cannot evaluate the effects here

The presence of universal quantification is confirmed by the compatibility with *almost*, which derives the scalar nature of this use of *same*, and with exceptive phrases (cf. Alrenga 2006):

(16) a. Frozen fish is *almost* the same as fresh fish.
   b. *Except* for its expensive leather interior, my new car is the same as my last one.
Independent evidence for the phonologically null quantificational noun above can be drawn from the mathematical use of cardinals (Hofweber 2005, Ionin and Matushansky 2006):

(17) a. Two and two are/is four.
    b. For whatever X, two X and two X are four X.

In the analysis of cardinals proposed in Ionin and Matushansky 2006, any mathematical cardinal must have a complement with the semantics of the null noun above.

NB: Barker’s treatment of *same* is eminently compatible with the semantics in Ionin and Matushansky 2006.

The “orphaned” *same* contains a null NP.

Further evidence 1: In Hebrew, an overt noun is used with *same* in the post-copular position (with some complications we leave aside for now):

(18) kol ha-gvarim hem oto (ha-) davar.  
    all DEF men 3PL DEM-M.SG DEF thing  
    *All men are the same.*

Can the property comparison reading in the predicative position in French, English and Dutch be derived in the same way as in Hebrew, with a null noun (e.g., *thing* or *sort*)?  

NB: Obviously, *thing* does not mean *object*, here, more likely *the same kind of thing*.

NB: The use of a demonstrative to indicate identity is not limited to Hebrew – see below.

Further evidence 2: In Dutch, the choice between the two readings has a grammatical effect:

(19) a. Deze krant is dezelfde als die krant.  
    object  
    *This journal is the same as that journal (i.e., there’s only one journal).*

    b. Deze krant is hetzelfde als die krant.  
    property  
    *This journal is the same as that journal (i.e., these journals are alike).*

In (19a) we’re really talking about one journal (either the same copy, or the same title (the so-called type-token ambiguity)). In (19b) we could be talking about different journals, as long as they have the same relevant properties (for instance, they can have the same color, if we’re interested in the library color-scheme).

In (19a), the definite article on *same* shows the same gender as the subject. In (19b), the definite article on *same* is neuter.

In (19a), the missing NP in the post-copular DP is *journal*; in (19b), it is something else – see above.

2.1.2.  *Same* under degree operators

Alrenga 2006: the property comparison reading of *same* is available in argument positions:

(20) a. Interestingly, both too little iron and too much iron can cause almost the same symptoms.

    b. Alice and Beth bought almost the same car.

The trick we have used to derive the scalar/property comparison reading of *same* in the post-copular position is unavailable here (not syntactic slot for a quantificational noun). However, it can be shown that the property comparison reading here is not the same.

Kind-interpretation is involved for singular NPs: (20b) can only mean that Alice and Beth bought cars that almost belong to the same kind. This suggests that we are dealing here with *scalarity coercion* (Matushansky 2002):
(21) $\lambda P . \lambda x . x$ has a number of the typical properties associated with being $P$

a. You’re such a linguist.

b. This wine is more French than I am.

On the other hand, for plural NPs, as in (20a), we are concerned with the amount of overlap between the plural individuals.

Neither of these interpretations is involved in the nounless same, suggesting that different mechanisms are used.

2.1.3. Same under cardinals

Unlike the English same, its Dutch equivalent can appear under a cardinal, with a reciprocal reading (though a deictic one is also available):

(22) Ik heb twee dezelfde boeken nodig.

I have two the+same books need

$I$ need two books that are the same.

We have no plausible derivation for this environment now, though the presence of a definite determiner inside the indefinite NP is certainly suggestive.

2.2. Summary

Barker’s analysis of same can be extended to cover its appearance and behavior in the post-copular position, whether accompanied by an overt noun (section 5.3) or not.

We derive the property comparison reading of same from its object comparison reading and show that different mechanisms are used in different environments:

a. identity coercion and a quantificational null NP in the post-copular position

b. scalarity coercion in combination with degree operators or modifiers

The different mechanisms involved argue against derivation in the opposite direction. Given the possibility of deriving one meaning from the other, lexical ambiguity is undesirable.

3. THE SAME, IN RUSSIAN

Different lexicalization pattern: the particle že (roughly corresponding to the emphatic just in English) and the adjective odinakov-.

(23) a. Lena i Vera kupili odni i te že knigi

Lena and Vera bought one-pl and those just books

$Lena and Vera bought the same books.$

b. Lena i Vera kupili odinakovye knigi

Lena and Vera bought same books

$Lena and Vera bought books that were the same.$

(23a) means that Lena and Vera either bought the same stack of books (unlikely) or the same list of titles. (23b) means that they bought books that were the same in all the relevant ways.

3.1. Property comparison

The adjective odinakov- obligatorily involves property comparison.

(24) a. Lena kupila tri odinakovye knigi

Lena bought three same books

$Lena bought three books that were all the same.$
b. Ix vzgljady byli odinakovy.
their views were same
Their views were the same.

With a singular NP the adjective *odinakov-* ‘same’ becomes ungrammatical (unless the noun is relational and abstract, see section 5.1). This suggests that it has a reciprocal reading only, which is confirmed by the fact that it disallows a comparison item (26):

(25) a. Lena i Vera kupili odin i tot že dom.
Lena and Vera bought one-M.SG and that-M.SG JUST house
*Lena and Vera bought the same house (i.e., both paid for the same thing).*

b. *Lena i Vera kupili odinakovvyj dom.*
Lena and Vera bought same-M.SG house

c. Lena i Vera kupili odinakovye doma.
Lena and Vera bought same-PL house
*Lena and Vera bought houses that were just the same (i.e., very similar).*

NB: *odinakov-* does not mean ‘similar’, which only requires for one property to be shared (Alrenga 2006)

(26) *Lena kupila odinakovye knigi, čto/kak i Vera
Lena bought same books that/as AND Vera

Since a comparison item is disallowed, the anaphoric reading is impossible. We conclude that *odinakov-* ‘same’ does not contain a hidden reciprocal (cf. Beck’s analysis of the reciprocal *different* as underlyingly a relational adjective)

It would seem that deriving the property comparison reading of *odinakov-* ‘same’ from some other reading (like we did for *same*) is problematic: no other reading is ever attested.

The simplest analysis of *odinakov-* ‘same’ would be to slightly modify the meaning proposed by Alrenga 2006:

(27) $\text{[odinakov-]} = \lambda x . \forall f_{(e, o)} [\forall x, y \leq X [P(x)=P(y)]]$

Worse, the alternative “generic” *same* in Russian does not allow reciprocity!

3.2. Particle *że*: the distribution

The particle *że* always appears attached to some deictic element (the distal demonstrative *to* ‘that’, the similarity demonstratives *tak* ‘so’ and *takoj* ‘such’, or even adjunct demonstratives of time and space):

NB: On other uses of the particle *że* (all of them emphatic) see section 5.2

**Property comparison** is expressed by the use of the similarity demonstrative ‘such’ + *że*:

(28) a. Lena kupila takuju že knigu, kak (i) Vera.
Lena bought such JUST book that AND Vera
*Lena bought the same kind of book as Vera.*

b. Liza byla takaja že, kak (i) vse devuški v ee vozraste.
Liza was such JUST how AND all girls in her age
*Liza was like other girls her age.*

(29) a. Ljuboj postupil by točno tak že.
Anyone behaved COND exactly so JUST
*Anyone would have behaved in the same way.*

b. Liza vospitana tak že, kak ee mama.
Liza brought up so JUST how her mother
*Liza is brought up like her mother.*
Object comparison is expressed by the distal demonstrative ‘that’ + že:

(30) Lena kupila tu že knigu, čto i Vera. 
Lena bought that JUST book that AND Vera
Lena bought the same book as Vera.

Other deixis-related pronouns also combine with že:

(31) a. Ja edu tuda že, kuda i ty. 
I go-1SG there JUST where AND you
I’m going to the same place you are.

b. On uznal ob ètom togda že kogda i my. 
he learn-PST-M.SG about this then JUST when AND we
He learned about it at the same time we did.

Only the distal demonstrative to ‘that’ allows an internal reading, which is due to the fact that such a reading is not possible in absence of a reinforcement:

(32) Lena i Vera kupili *(odin i) tot že dom. 
Lena and Vera bought one-M.SG and that-M.SG JUST house
Lena and Vera bought (one and) the same house.

Since no similar reinforcement is possible for other deictic pronouns, they cannot be used so

3.2.1. Relative clause

The distribution of the particle že leaves us with little doubt that the deictic use of the Russian same is constructed on the basis of a relative clause introduced by a demonstrative:

NB: There are some dissimilarities, which need not concern us here, in particular concerning the presence of the relative pronoun

(33) a. Rybalka načinaetsja togda, kogda zakančivaetsja spirt. 
fishing starts then when finishes alcohol
Fishing starts when the booze is over.

b. Ty pomniš’ tu studentku-grečanku, kotoraja rabotala u nas v Rime? 
you remember that student Greek which worked with us in Rome
Do you remember that Greek student who worked with us in Rome?

NB: As the English gloss in (33b) shows, the demonstrative here introduces a specific indefinite. This is fully in agreement with the choice-function treatment of same proposed by Barker to appear, with certain adjustments

The correlation between same and the demonstrative pronoun is also found in English:

(34) a. Alice bought Neverwhere. Beth bought that very book as well. 
b. We already bought Neverwhere. Why did you have to buy just that book?

Further similarity between English that and Russian to is revealed by the fact that in Russian, in absence of an overt comparison item (i.e., with a discourse-anaphoric reading), the elative adjective samyj ‘very’ (a possible cognate of same) must be added to the distal demonstrative (but not to the similarity demonstrative):

(35) a. Lena iščet takie že knigi. 
Lena looks for such-PL JUST books
Lena is looking for this kind of books.

a. Lena iščet te že *(samye) knigi. 
Lena looks for such-PL JUST very books
Lena is looking for these very books.
It can be argued that in discourse-anaphoric environments, the demonstratives function truly deictically, as thus no particular item can be associated with the meaning akin to *same*.

The comparison between the Russian particle *že* and the (limited) English strategy of using a demonstrative pronoun strongly suggests that *že* is not the locus of a meaning comparable to the English *same*, but rather that the whole construction just is a straightforward relative clause suborned for new purposes.

3.2.2. Property or object?

The particle has to be attached to a demonstrative (tot ‘that’ or takoj ‘such’). While the distal demonstrative tot ‘that’ permits only object comparison, the similarity demonstrative takoj ‘such’ only allows property comparison:

(36) a. Lena kupila tu že knigu, čto i Vera can mean ‘same book copy’
   Lena bought that JUST book that AND Vera
   Lena bought the same book as Vera.

b. Lena kupila takuju že knigu, kak i Vera cannot mean ‘same book copy’
   Lena bought that JUST book how AND Vera
   Lena bought the same book as Vera.

This difference in lexicalization shows that Russian lexically distinguishes between property comparison and object comparison: neither is coerced from the other.

3.2.3. Reciprocity

The particle *že* cannot have an internal (reciprocal) reading, DP-externally or in the predicate position. In other words, it requires an internal argument (introduced by a comparison clause or as a discourse antecedent):

(37) a. Lena kupila tri odinakovye knigi. reciprocal only
   Lena bought three same books
   Lena bought three books that were all the same.

b. Lena kupila tri takie/takix že knigi. anaphoric only
   Lena bought three such-PL-NOM/GEN JUST books
   Lena bought three books that were the same (as some previously mentioned ones).

(38) a. Èti knigi (točno) takie že. anaphoric only
   these books exactly such-PL JUST
   These books are (exactly) the same.

b. *Èti knigi odni i te že.
   these books one-PL AND these JUST

Since the particle *že* combines with an item that is deixis-dependent, it is unsurprising that no internal reading is possible. This would seem to support the conjecture (Barker to appear, vs. Dowty 1985) that the anaphoric use of *same* is not the same as its other uses.

3.2.4. Predicational use of *same*

In Russian as in Dutch, only the property comparison reading of *same* is possible in the post-copular position. Two possible realizations: the particle *že* accompanied by the similarity demonstrative takoj ‘such’ (for a deictic reading), or the adjective odinakov- ‘same’ (for a reciprocal reading):
(24) b. Vse mužčiny [odinakovy] all men same-SF-PL.
    All men are the same.

(28) b. Liza byla [takaja] że, kak (i) vse devuški v ee vozraste. Liza was such JUST how AND all girls in her age.
     Liza was like other girls her age.

(39) a. *Eti knigi [te] že samye. if discourse-anaphoric
    these books these JUST EMPH-PL

b. *Eti ljudi odni i [te] že. these people one-PL AND these JUST

NB: We’re not committed to (28b) being predicative – it is fully compatible with NP-ellipsis (see Babby 1973, 1975, Bailyn 1994, Siegel 1976 and Pereltsvaig 2001 on long and short forms of Russian adjectives).

3.3. Summary

The lexicalization pattern for the Russian same provides evidence for formally distinguishing property comparison and object comparison.

Russian also shows that the property comparison reading is the only one available in the predicate position. The fact that this reading can be purely adjectival shows that it is not coerced in the same way it is in English.

Conversely, the lexical and syntactic decomposition of the “generic” (že) construction shows that same in Russian cannot be treated as a single lexical item.

Major issue: can lexicalization patterns from one language be used to study lexical items in others?

4. Concluding Remarks

An investigation of same yields two immediate results:
- Property comparison vs. object comparison
- Different lexicalization patterns across Beck’s characterizations

Conclusions:
- In English, property comparison readings are derived from the object comparison one
- In Russian, they are lexically distinguished; however, the Russian ‘generic’ same is itself not properly a lexical item

Some of the questions for future research:
- Do these findings shed any light on different, given that it is much more likely to be lexicalized as a true adjective?
- We believe that a decomposition of Barker’s analysis is possible, which should also account for Russian. If so, the components of the analysis should be the same for the two languages, but the way they are combined may not be
- It would seem that for English, it is possible to derive the deictic meaning from the reciprocal one, contrary to standard strategies (work in progress), but exactly the opposite appears to be true for Russian (given that the reciprocal use is augmented with respect to the deictic one; note also the strictly anaphoric use of just that NP in English).
- As the English same can be licensed by relative clauses, under certain (restricted) syntactic conditions, the question arises how this use relates to the reciprocal one
5. **APPENDICES**

5.1. Implicit arguments

The behavior of certain singulars with the reciprocal *odinakov-* ‘same’ in Russian suggests that reciprocity can be licensed by implicit arguments.

As mentioned above, *odinakov-* ‘same’ is generally ungrammatical with a singular NP:

(40) a. Lena i Vera kupili odin i tot že dom.
    Lena and Vera bought one-M.SG and that-M.SG JUST house
    *Lena and Vera bought the same house (i.e., both paid for the same thing).

b. *Lena i Vera kupili odinakovoyj dom.
    Lena and Vera bought same-M.SG house

c. Lena i Vera kupili odinakovye doma.
    Lena and Vera bought same-PL house
    Lena and Vera bought houses that were just the same (i.e., very similar).

Unless the noun is relational and abstract:

(41) a. Oni polučali odnu i tu že zarplatu
    They received one-F.SG and that-F.SG JUST salary

b. Oni polučali odinakovuju zarplatu
    They received same salary

(42) U nas odinakovoj vzgljad na vešči
    with us same view on things
    *We have the same point of view.

Assuming that the nouns licensing *odinakov-* ‘same’ contain an implicit argument and that it is plural in examples like (41b) and (42), the NP-internal reading of *same* (Barker to appear) can still be licensed, under certain assumptions about the scopal position of the licensor (and the lexical entry in (27) would have to be adjusted).

The question arises why concrete relational nouns cannot be singular with *odinakov-* ‘same’:

(43) U nas odin i tot že/ *odinakovoj otce
    with us one and that JUST same father
    *We have the same father.

We hypothesize that the impossibility of *odinakov-* ‘same’ in (43) arises from blocking.

5.2. Other uses of the Russian particle že

Russian equatives also contain the particle že (which confirms the general similarity between equatives and *same* (see Heim 1985, Beck 2000 on different):

(44) a. Èta gora takaja že vysokaja kak i ta.
    this-F.SG mountain such JUST tall how AND that-F.SG

b. Lena kupila takuju že doroguju knigu kak i Vera.
    Lena bought such-F.SG JUST expensive book how AND Vera

**NB:** We have been unable to find cases where an AP-internal combination of *tak ‘so’* or *takoj ‘such’* with the particle *same* would have an interpretation other than degree. We intend to return to this fact eventually.

An alternative way of expressing the equative meaning is with the *odinakov-* adverb:
(45) Liza i Lina odinakovo glupi.
Liza and Lina same-ADV stupid-PL
Liza and Lina are stupid to the same degree.

Finally, the affirmative use of too is also expressed via the particle že (though the spelling is different):

(46) a. Dina kupila knigu, a takže gazetu
Dina bought book and also newspaper
b. Dina kupila knigu, a takže pročla gazetu
Dina bought book and also read newspaper
c. Dina prosto umnaja, a Rina takže i krasivaja
Dina simply smart and Rina also AND beautiful
d. Obe podrugi kupili knigi, a Rina takže sxodila v kino
both friends bought books and Rina and went to cinema

Under certain circumstances, takže ‘also, too’ is interchangeable with tože ‘too’:

(47) a. Dina kupila knigu, a Rina kupila i gazetu tozhe
Dina bought book and Rina bought AND newspaper also
b. Dina kupila knigu, a Rina kupila i gazetu takzhe
Dina bought book and Rina bought AND newspaper also

It is possible that takže ‘also, too’ and tože ‘too’ are verum counterparts of same. If true, this suggests that že is indeed the locus of emphasis.

There are other uses of the particle že, but they are probably not related:

(48) a. Dina kupila knigu. RINA že kupila gazetu. contrastive stress on Rina
Dina bought book Rina JUST bought newspaper
Dina bought a book. Rina, on the other hand, bought a newspaper.

b. Idém že.
go-PRS-1PL JUST
Do let us go! Let’s go, finally!

c. V nekotoryx že slučajx nado prosto drapat’.
in certain-PL JUST cases necessary simply scram
In certain cases, however, one should simply scram.

The clausal že appears to be a second-position clitic.

5.3. Identity coercion

Let’s consider slightly more revealing examples (cf. Zimmermann 2005):

(49) a. Ruth Rendell and Barbara Vine are the same person. true
b. Ruth Rendell and Barbara Vine are the same writer. false

Why is the post-copular NP singular?

(50) *Ruth Rendell and Barbara Vine are a writer/a person.

The problem doesn’t arise if (49) is an identity copula, rather than the predicate one:

(51) a. λX ∃f ∀x∈X 1y [id(y)(x) ∧ f(person)(y)] (Ruth Rendell⊕Barbara Vine) = 
∃f 1y [id(y)(Ruth Rendall) ∧ id(y)(Barbara Vine) ∧ f(person)(y)]
b. λX ∃f ∀x∈X 1y [id(y)(x) ∧ f(writer)(y)] (Ruth Rendell⊕Barbara Vine) 
∃f 1y [id(y)(Ruth Rendall) ∧ id(y)(Barbara Vine) ∧ f(writer)(y)]
Problem: How can (51a) and (51b) have different truth values given (52)?

(52) a. Ruth Rendell/Barbara Vine is a writer. true
    b. Ruth Rendell/Barbara Vine is a person. either both true or both false

We therefore need to assume that identity is a bit looser than we had thought when it comes to individuals:

(53) \[ \text{[ID]} \ (x)(y) = 1 \iff \exists z \ [x \angle z \text{ and } y \angle z] \text{ identity coercion} \]

where \( x \angle z \) if \( x \) is an aspect/guise/perspective of \( z \), a temporal stage of \( z \), or \( z \) itself

Importantly, identity coercion (\( \angle \)) is only applicable between entities of the same type/sort and has nothing to do with part/whole relations obtaining between a plural and its component singulants, or between a kind and its component realizations, or even between a singular entity and its parts

Identity coercion is also required for the regular identity copula, without \( \text{same} \):

(54) Barbara Vine is Ruth Rendell.

We can now propose an explanation for relative identity:

(i) Different predicates have different applicability conditions (e.g., \( \text{being a person} \) holds throughout the lifetime of a human being, while \( \text{being a writer} \) does not)

(ii) However, one entity can be a stage or an aspect of another entity (cf. (54)), in a more or less similar fashion

(iii) This holds also for entities picked out by choice functions, where it is the NP that permits identifying what sub-type an entity belongs to

\( \text{NB:} \) It is possible that a generalized version of the identity coercion operator \( \angle \) is available for any argument NP. Then it is possible to \textit{rethink identity in terms of predication}, which is not a project to be undertaken lightly

The coercion analysis naturally extends to the “transitive” \( \text{same} \), even we have not provided a lexical entry for it (nor do we intend to, for the purposes of this presentation):

(55) a. Ruth Rendell is the same person as Barbara Vine.
    b. Ruth Rendell is the same writer as Barbara Vine.

\( \text{NB:} \) At this point, we have no articulated analysis of the \textit{deictic reading of same}, but we devoutly hope that it is not a different lexical item

5.4. \textit{Identical} is not the same

Unlike \( \text{same} \), \textit{identical} does not require a noun:

(56) a. These books are identical.
    b. This man is identical to that man.

\( \text{Moltmann 2006:} \) \textit{identical} is about absolute rather than relative identity. Does this mean that a sortal is not required? How can this explain why a sortal is impossible:

(57) \( \text{(In the same scenario as (9))} \)

a. ""It’s an identical lump of metal.
    b. ""It’s not an identical statue.

Furthermore, unlike \( \text{same, identical} \) does not have an object comparison reading:

(58) a. \textit{Re-Birth} and \textit{Trouble with Lichen} are the same book.
    b. * \textit{Re-Birth} and \textit{Trouble with Lichen} are the/an identical book.

Since universals license an object-comparison reading only, it is unsurprising that \textit{identical} cannot be licensed by a universal:

(59) * Every girl bought an identical book.
Plural NPs do not license *identical* with a singular. When we see *identical* with a plural NP, it is because it can have a reciprocal reading inside the plural it is contained in:

(60) a. Allie and Bee bought the same book.
   b. *Allie and Bee bought an identical book.
   c. Allie and Bee bought identical books.

This difference between *identical* and *same* confirms Beck’s distinction between the plural NP-dependent reading and the reciprocal one.

Just like the property-comparison reading of *same*, *identical* can be discourse-anaphoric:

(61) Since Allie always does whatever Bee does, it unsurprising that she bought an identical book.

Just like the property-comparison *same*, *identical* is scalar.

(62) These books are almost/nearly/completely identical.

Unlike *same* in English and like *dezelfde* in Dutch, *identical* can appear under a cardinal with a reciprocal reading:

(63) Three identical books stood on the shelf.

However, the property-comparison reading of *identical* is not that of *same*:

(64) a. Men are all the same.
   b. *Men are all identical.

As we already know that the English *same* does not have a reciprocal reading except in the predicate position, and as in the predicate position it arises as a result of coercion, this is not really surprising.

However, it is also unlike the strictly reciprocal Russian *odinakov*-: *identical* allows an overt argument, which is necessarily phrasal (rather than clausal):

(65) a. *Lena kupila odinakovye knigi, čto/kak i Vera/èti
   Lena bought same books that/as AND Vera/these
   b. Lena bought books identical to these/*to Vera/*as Vera.

This is another distinction between *same* and *identical*: *same* combines with what looks like a CP (introduced by *as*).

**REFERENCES**


