1. CARITIVES: SYNTACTIC BACKGROUND

A caritive is generally a PP, but the corresponding case (abessive in Uralic, aka privative for Australian languages, anticomitative, or deprivative) is also attested:

S/he went abroad without money and without a passport.

Some discussion of caritive data:


A caritive PP can be an NP-adjunct or a VP-adjunct:

(2) a. Elle était une petite enfant sans parures [...] Choi-Jonin 2006
She was a small child without adornments.

b. Il a coupé le pain dur sans couteau. Choi-Jonin and Mignon 2010
He cut the hard bread without knife.

VP-modifiers can be nominal (2b) or clausal (3):

(3) a. Il tonne sans pleuvoir. Feigenbaum 1996
It thunders without rain.

b. Il est parti sans qu’on s’en aperçoive. Choi-Jonin and Mignon 2010
He has left without anyone noticing.

The nominal complement of sans ‘without’ need not be bare and it can easily be definite:

(4) a. Je me suis retrouvé sans Marie. Choi-Jonin and Mignon 2010
I found myself without Marie.

b. l’utopie Yiddish sans un aréopage de propagandistes the.utopia Yiddish without a areopagus of propagandists
a Yiddish utopia without an areopagus of propagandists

But in NP-internal caritives the bare NP is preferred

Acknowledgments: Many thanks to Eddy Ruys and Joost Zwarts for discussion and comments.
2. WITHOUT INTERFACE

The use of a bare NP in caritives in French and Dutch suggests property or kind denotation

2.1. To have and to have not


\[(5) \text{ with (NEG (NP))} \quad \text{Muller 1991:404}\]

Natural hypothesis: bare NPs here are properties (cf. the incorporating analysis of have and HAVE-verbs (Borthen 2003, Dobrovie-Sorin, Bleam and Espinal 2006, Espinal and McNally 2010, Le Bruyn, de Swart and Zwarts 2013))

The connection may be not evident in the formal representation, but the intuition is clear:

\[(6) \begin{align*}
\text{a. } & [\text{met}] = \lambda N. \lambda M. \lambda x. M(x) \land \exists y. N(y) \land \text{HAVE}(x,y) \quad \text{Le Bruyn, de Swart and Zwarts 2012} \\
\text{b. } & [\text{zonder}] = \lambda N. \lambda M. \lambda x. M(x) \land \exists y. N(y) \land \text{HAVE}(x,y)
\end{align*}\]

The assertion of (non)existence then comes from the lexical entries for have and with(out)

2.2. Without incorporation

The semantics of incorporation is not quite right:

\[(7) \begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \lambda x . \text{bag} (x) \land \neg \exists y \text{ zipper} (y) \land \text{HAVE} (y)(x) \quad \Rightarrow \text{wrong} \\
\text{b. } & \lambda x . \text{bag} (x) \land \exists y \text{ zipper} (y) \land \neg \text{HAVE} (y)(x) \quad \Rightarrow \text{always true}
\end{align*}\]

(7a) asserts a total lack of zippers on the bag, but doesn’t entail the uniqueness

(7b) will always be true because there is always a zipper that a bag does not have

Feigenbaum 1996: sans ‘without’ introduces the presupposition that the absent entity should be present

3. WHERE IS POSSESSION?


Burton 1995, Ritter and Rosen 1997, Landman 2004: have is semantically underspecified to a relation between two entities

Possession is in the argument structure of the possessee

Guéron 1985, 1995, Tellier 1990, Sæbø 2009: the internal argument slot of relational nouns is saturated by a null pronoun, which is then {coindexed with/bound by} the subject of have:

\[(8)\]
This mechanism cannot be used for NP-internal caritives because there is no entity-denoting NP to bind the possessee.

But the same result can be achieved by composition:

\[(\text{have}) = \lambda R \lambda w \exists v (R(w)(v))\]

where R is a relation of type \((e, (e, t))\) (e.g., sister).

Burton 1995: have and 's introduce an underspecified R relation which can be identified with the one provided by the argument structure of the possessee.

Similar proposals for adnominal possession (e.g., Higginbotham 1983, Burton 1995, Vikner and Jensen 2002, Karvovskaya 2018)

3.1. Relational caritives

Adopting the same analysis, Feigenbaum’s existence presupposition can be achieved if the existentially quantified relational possessee scopes over negation, and what is lacking is instantiation (= the possessee is not instantiated on the possessor):

\[(\text{a bag without a zipper}) = \lambda x . \text{bag}(x) \wedge \exists y \text{zipper}(x)(y) \wedge \neg \text{WITH}(y)(x)\]

However, this presupposes that the relevant zipper exists and excludes the possibility that the bag never had any zippers in the first place!

Changing the scope does not help, as it excludes the possibility that a zipper remains on the bag (e.g., in a situation where one of the two zippers has been torn out):

\[\lambda x . \text{bag}(x) \wedge \neg \exists y \text{zipper}(x)(y) \wedge \text{WITH}(y)(x)\]

Both scopal relations are attested:

NB: For some people (12b) is weird and is interpreted as (12a)

(12) a. une porte sans poignée
a door without handle
\quad a door without a handle

b. un chien sans pied
a dog without foot
\ne a legless dog

\quad a dog without a leg

c. une robe sans manches
a dress without sleeves
\quad a sleeveless dress, a dress with (*some) sleeves missing

The singular marking always entails a single possessee and the plural marking always entails plurality (cf. Sauerland, Anderssen and Yatsushiro 2005 for #Does the girl have noses?)

The scope of the existential and the negation inside the caritive preposition must be fixed (cf. -less)

3.2. Kind or property?

Property-denotation for the complement of without is supported by independent evidence: the partitive de in the presence of an intervening modifier (Grevisse 2006:1389) or with higher negation (Larrivée 2009):

(13) a. sans *(presque/ vraiment) d' efforts
without almost/really of efforts
\quad almost/really without efforts
b. je ne mens jamais sans de bonnes raisons
   I never lie without good reasons.

The missing object cannot be referred to by a relative pronoun; for anaphoric pronouns this is marginally possible:

(14) C’était un jeune soldat sans nez…
   this+was a young soldier without nose
   It was a young soldier without a nose.

a. *qu’il avait perdu à Waterloo.
   REL+3MSG.NOM had lost at Waterloo
b. %Il l’avait perdu à Waterloo.
   3MSG.NOM 3SG.ACC+had lost at Waterloo
   He had lost it at Waterloo.

Correlation: in Romance and Germanic NP predicates are bare

Problems:

- number: the caritive NP can be plural
- quantification: the complement of a caritive preposition can be quantified
- article: the French avoir ‘have’ does not combine with a bare NP

and there is no effect of modification for bareness or a constraint to roles (on this cf. Roy 2001, de Swart, Winter and Zwarts 2005, 2007, Matushansky and Spector 2005, etc.)

(15) a. le Louvre sans Mona Lisa/aucun tableau
   the Louvre without Mona Lisa/any painting
   the Louvre without Mona Lisa/any painting
b. une robe sans manches
   a dress without sleeves
   a dress without sleeves

Caritive prepositions can take an e-type internal argument. Hence the denotation of a caritive bare NP in French should make it compatible with an ⟨e, ⟨e, t⟩⟩ preposition

Hypothesis: the bare NP is kind-denoting (rather than property-denoting):

(16) [[a bag without a zipper]]
    λx . bag (x) ¬ WITH(ZIPPER)(x)

Assuming kind denotation explains the bareness (cf. Aguilar-Guevara and Zwarts 2010, 2013 on weak definites) and permits a contrast with have with a minimal change to the semantics

Existential quantification is introduced internally to without concomitantly with realization

Unification with other abessive opaque predicates becomes possible

4. KINDS OF NON-EXISTENCE

There are other instances where an indefinite has been treated as kind-referring: with caritive predicates (missing), with creation failure verbs (prevent) and language-specifically for kinds

4.1. The missing link

Higginbotham 1989, Zimmermann 2010: missing as an opaque predicate

Dowty 1985, citing Irene Heim and Emmon Bach: missing has an intensional subject:
(17) a. A screw is missing from this TV set.
    b. The spare tire is missing from this car.

Higginbotham 1989: *missing* is an unaccusative predicate with intensional interpretation with the subject originating low. There is a transitive variant:

(18) This TV set is missing a screw.

“In short, missing involves failing to have”. No specific proposal is made

Zimmermann 2010: *missing* is a two-place predicate requiring the entity its subject is missing from and a modal component: “After all, Peter cannot be said to be missing from the German government x just because it happens to have a vacancy and Peter does not happen to be a minister”.

(19) \((\forall j) >_i (p, x) \& I_j (p, x))\)

where the transitive constant I expresses the concept of completing (being part of, taking part in, etc., and \(>_i\) introduces, roughly, possible worlds (indices) where the minimally different x is complete

In other words, *missing* means lacking a part that is obligatory for completeness

If the subject is quantified, it can scope above or below the universal…

…except this doesn’t give rise to the precise truth-conditions required! Zimmermann 2010 introduces several hypotheses, including turning the missing part into a transitive property (e.g., *screw* is *screw of*), but does not arrive at a firm conclusion

Important: *missing* combines with a generalized quantifier, not a property!

Hence the intensionality cannot be achieved by assuming that the complement is a property, as in Zimmermann 1993 or Van Geenhoven and McNally 2005, but the analysis of Moltmann 1997 might work

(20) Every screw is missing.
    a. All the screws are not where they are supposed to be. specific
    b. Where there are supposed to be screws, there is nothing. non-specific

But is this genuine ambiguity?

(21) Two missing screws have been replaced. Zimmermann 2010

Zimmermann 2010 sketches an intentionalist analysis, with the denotation of the noun *screw* including both ordinary screws and missing ones (cf. Condoravdi, Crouch and van den Berg 2001, Condoravdi et al. 2001)

4.2. Preventing accidents

Condoravdi, Crouch and van den Berg 2001, Condoravdi et al. 2001: while (22) is ambiguous between a general and a specific readings, neither of the two asserts existence of an accident:

(22) Safety procedures at Chernobyl prevented a serious nuclear accident.
    a. general: no accident occurred false
    b. specific: there was an accident that could have happened but didn’t potentially true

Condoravdi, Crouch and van den Berg 2001: non-indefinite NPs are restricted to a specific reading implying a set of particular potential objects quantified over

The direct object of *prevent* can be a DE-environment (under the general reading)

Proposal: the direct object of *prevent* denotes in the domain of concepts rather than entities:

(23) a. \(\exists y \exists X . X = \text{SNA} . \text{safety.procedure} (y) \& \text{prevent} (y,X)\) general
    b. \(\exists y \exists X . X \subseteq \text{SNA} . \text{safety.procedure} (y) \& \text{prevent} (y,X)\) specific

The specific reading involves sub-types of a concept (there is a sub-type of accident that was prevented)
Problem: why is the article indefinite in (22) for the reading in (23a)?

The lexical meaning of *prevent* entails non-instantiation of the relevant concept:

\[(24) \quad \forall x \forall T. \, \text{prevent}(x,T) \rightarrow \neg \text{instantiated}(T)\]

What is a concept (both formally and intuitively)?

- Condoravdi et al.: it is an individual (a first-order entity)

In essence, it is what we call a kind when we do not mean the sum of all of its instantiations (cf. Carlson 2010)

### 4.3. Two kinds

The word *kind* is used to denote (at least) two different things:

- entities referred to by bare plurals or mass nouns in English generic sentences
- entities referred to by singular definite subjects of inherently kind level predicates (the same as the well-established kind of KrifKa et al. 1995?)

\[(25)\]

a. Tigers eat meat.
b. The tiger is the largest cat species.

Intensionalized sum of all instantiations (\(\langle s, \langle c, t \rangle \rangle\) vs. a species or established kind (type e)

Rothstein 2013: the notion of an *encyclopedic kind* is independently needed:

Doron 2003, Rothstein 2013: A singular kind-denoting NP in Hebrew is bare and unlike a proper name not introduced with the direct object marker required for definites:

\[(26) \quad \text{be- yamim ele menase cevet mada’anim sqoti le-šabet (*et) namer tasmani.}\]

\[\quad \text{in days these try.sg team scientists Scottish to-clone DOM tiger Tasmanian}\]

\[\text{Currently a Scottish team of scientists is trying to clone the Tasmanian tiger.}\]

The appearance of the definite article leads to anaphoric interpretation

In Hebrew there is no difference in definiteness: *prevent* cases are also bare

### 4.4. Intermediate summary

There is a technical way of handling the lack of existential commitment with wide scope – by assuming kind-denotation

This is compatible with the lack of an article in caritives in Romance and most Germanic

However, it excludes appealing to QR as a way of achieving the two scopal relations between the negation and the existential, and does not explain the distribution of articles and their lack

### 5. Relational kinds

The scopal issue in a nutshell (recap):

\[(27) \quad \text{une porte sans poignée}\]

\[\text{a. door without handle}\]

\[\quad \text{a door without a handle}\]

\[\text{b. } \lambda x. \text{door}(x) \& \neg \exists y [\text{handle}(y) \& \neg \text{WITH}(y, x)]\]

\[\text{(27a) asserts the existence of a handle that is not located on the door in question: always true}\]

\[\text{(27b) asserts that the door has no handles: retains the issue of interpretable number (the use of the singular entails the presupposition that there is only one handle)}\]
5.1. What is needed: relational nouns

Intuition: it is not just any handle that the door is missing: it is its own handle

(28) a. \( \lambda x \cdot \text{door}(x) \land \exists y [\text{handle}(y, x) \land \neg \text{AT}(y, x)] \)

(28b) looks like the correct semantics for the specific reading of (27): there is a handle of the door that is not present at it

(28b) correctly claims that the door has no handles, but does not explain why the non-specific reading entails that there is only one handle on the door and that it should have one

Compositionality issues:

- In English the equivalent of the caritive NP has an indefinite article. How does a relational noun combine with an article?
- What happens when the complement of without is a definite or a universal NP?

These questions have been partially answered in the literature on possession

In Romance and the rest of Germanic the caritive NP (the possessee) is bare: it cannot scope

Natural answer: it denotes a property (NP predicates are bare in both Romance and the rest of Germanic) or a kind

6. A CONCEPTUAL SOLUTION

An NP can denote a property of entities or a concept (semantic sort \( e_k \)):

- independently needed for prevent, where sub-concepts are introduced
- potentially the same thing as templates introduced by Piñón 2008 to account for verbs of creation (on which see also von Stechow 2001, Kamp and Roßdeutscher 2003, Forbes 2006 (chapter 7), etc.)

There is no QR: the existential always takes scope over negation:

(29) a. \(# \text{a bag without a zipper}\# = \lambda x_k : R(x_k)(\text{ZIPPER}) \cdot \text{BAG}(x_k) \land \neg \text{AT}(\text{ZIPPER}, x_k) \)

In other words, the ambiguity in (27) is not an issue of scope:
- existential quantification does not lead to an assertion of existence
- existence (encoded above by the \( \text{AT} \) predicate) is relative to a location (cf. Freeze 1992, Borschev and Partee 1998)
- the existence of a concept “the handle of a bag” implies that bags normally have handles
- number is interpretable the same way it is for entities

This, however, is only the beginning; we need the composition:

- the possessee (\text{handle}) should be treated as primarily a concept (for (Error! Reference source not found. b)))
- a concept is a sort of entity and entities cannot be relational, so the representation in (Error! Reference source not found. b) should be adjusted
- concepts needed here are not the encyclopedic or well-established kinds, they are constructed
- the connection to possession should be made clear
6.1. The core concept

Starting hypothesis: *without* must take an entity-denoting complement (to account for QP and DP caritives)

Hence *handle* should denote an entity (the concept of a handle) and existential quantification in *without* should incorporate both *instantiation* as a sub-concept or as an individual and the *encoding of possession* (introduction of the internal argument)

Sæbø 2009: relational NPs contain a null pronoun, which is QRed and bound by a λ-operator (cf. Guéron 1985, 1995, Tellier 1990)

Problem: requires the noun to be transitive and the pronoun to be syntactically present

Alternative: existential disclosure (Dekker 1993):

\[ \text{Π}[y] = \lambda x . R(x)(y) \]  \( \text{def} \)  the property of being related to \( y \)

where \( R \) is the contextually salient relation invoked for possession

(31) Defining now *without* (non-intensionally, though this is probably a huge simplification):

(32) \[ \text{⟦without⟧} = \lambda x . \lambda y : \text{Π}(x)(y) . \neg \text{AT}(y, x) \]

In application to individuals, \( y \) is without \( x \) if there is a contextually salient relation linking \( x \) to \( y \) and \( x \) is not located at \( y \):

(33) \[ \text{⟦an English football team without Beckham⟧} = \lambda x : \text{R}(x)(B) . \text{EFT}(x) \land \neg \text{AT}(B, x) \]

\( R \) is most naturally understood here as the part-whole relation

With this semantics, *without* can combine with definite, indefinite or quantified complements and then with an NP via Predicate Modification, cf. Heim and Kratzer 1998

6.2. Derived concepts

Two ways of looking at concepts: as entities (type \( e \)) or as properties (functions from indices (or possible worlds) to sets, type \( \langle s, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle \))

Condoravdi, Crouch and van den Berg 2001, Condoravdi et al. 2001: presumably the latter

Intuition: concepts denote platonic ideals

Practical choice: if concepts are type \( e \), there is no need to rework NP-internal composition and determination

If they are \( \langle s, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle \), then we need flexible types for determiners and quantifiers

(34) \[ \text{⟦without a tail⟧} = \lambda x_k : \text{R}(x_k)(\text{TAIL}) . \neg \text{AT}(\text{TAIL}, x_k) \]

This is a predicate over sub-concepts of CAT, selecting those that do not have tails

Now, what does the modified NP denote?
If it is entity-denoting, then we get a proposition (\textit{CAT is supposed to have a tail, but doesn’t})
If it is a set of cat-kinds, then we get the wrong presuppositions: we would be selecting from
cat-kinds those that do have a tail as a matter of principle, i.e., exactly the wrong ones:
\[(36) \, [a \, \text{cat \, without \, a \, tail}] = \lambda x_k : R(x_k)(\text{TAIL}) \cdot \text{CAT}(x_k) \land \neg \, \text{AT} \, (\text{TAIL}, \, x_k)\]
So what we need is the presupposition that \textit{CAT} as a concept has a tail, but the sub-concepts
that we get as a result of modification, do not
This is a special case of the non-intersective nature of kind modification (though see McNally
and Boleda 2004):
\[(37) \, a. \, \text{sumčatyj \, medved’} \quad \text{Russian}
\text{bag.having.ADJ.MSG \, bear.M}
\text{koala bear}
b. \, \text{the Tasmanian tiger} \]
The koala bear is not a bear and the Tasmanian tiger is not a tiger (but maybe they just look
What we need is to pass from the single cat-kind (assumed to have a tail) to those sub-kinds
that lack it. So the presupposition should be about the cat-kind and the assertion, about its
sub-kinds (or instantiations)
In essence: the caritive PP should function as a modifier even when it could compose as the predicate. Does this
mean that modification is a mode of composition imposed by syntax?
As a stopgap: modification of a concept forces a switch to taxonomic denotation \textit{internally to the composition process}:
\[(38) \, [a \, \text{cat \, without \, a \, tail}] = \lambda x_k : R(\text{CAT})(\text{TAIL}) \cdot \text{CAT}(x_k) \land \neg \, \text{AT} \, (\text{TAIL}, \, x_k)\]
\text{CAT} enters the computation as an entity (a concept) and subsists as such in the presupposition,
but in the assertion it is coerced into a set
Something like this is independently needed for modified proper names (Kleiber 1981, 2005,
\[(39) \, a. \, \text{The upper Rhine is polluted.} \quad \text{material part}
b. \, \text{The upper river is polluted.} \]
\[(40) \, a. \, \text{The young W. A. Mozart visited Paris.} \quad \text{temporal stage}
b. \, \text{The young composer visited Paris.} \]
\[(41) \, a. \, \text{I will show you the secret Paris.} \quad \text{aspect/guise}
b. \, \text{I will show you the secret city.} \]
\[(42) \, \text{The Somerset Maugham that his nephew describes is a lot more disagreeable than the Somerset Maugham described by Somerset Maugham.} \quad \text{proxy?} \]
This is clearly relevant for caritives (e.g., \textit{the Louvre without Mona Lisa})

7. \textbf{Conclusion and Issues for the Future}

The ambiguity observed in the beginning is a matter of kind-modification rather than scope
The need for concepts has been independently motivated in a lot of literature. The unified perception of possession as parasitic on presupposed relations can be maintained.

### 7.1. Indefinite or bare?

It is not clear that the lack/presence of the article is related to the difference in semantic type. Unlike many other Romance or Germanic languages, French *avoir* does not take bare NPs:

\[(43)\]

\[\begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad \text{Han hadde rød ytterfrakk.} & \quad \text{Norwegian, Borthen 2003} \\
& \quad \text{He had a red coat.} \\
\text{b.} & \quad \text{Il avait un manteau rouge.} & \quad \text{French} \\
& \quad \text{He had a red coat.}
\end{align*}\]

Possible answers:
- the French *avoir* ‘have’ is not incorporating (why should it not be?), or
- the overtness of the article depends on case and *sans* assigns oblique rather than accusative.

### 7.2. For future research

An appeal to concepts complicates the ontology, but can it be avoided? How do we constrain their use and what does this mean for NP-internal composition in general?

Closest areas of application:
- Can *prevention* be handled in the same way?
- If *missing* works with concepts, what is the denotation of a *missing screw*?
- How do concepts connect to intensional “reconstruction” relatives (see Grosu and Krifka 2004, though the phenomenon is broader, cf. *the man of my dreams*)?
- What about various kinds of creation verbs?
- What about VP-modifying caritives?

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