

SPECIFIC EVIDENCE: DIFFERENTIAL ARGUMENTS AND (NON-ADJUNCT) SECONDARY PREDICATES

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Background. A rarely noticed (for two recent exceptions see Irimia 2011, or López 2012) pattern of differential objects (DOMs) is their *obligatory* formal marking in the context of a (non-adjunct) secondary predicate. More specifically, the sentences in (2-6) contain shared arguments functioning as objects with *consider*-type predicates. As seen in examples (2, 3, 4) languages that have overt differential object marking *must* use that morphology in such contexts. Another robust cross-linguistic observation is that these types of shared arguments, if indefinite, can only be interpreted as *specific* (strong, wide scope indefinites); *weak indefinite* readings (i.e. *some student or other*) are not possible (ex. 3-5); example (1b) shows that this restriction also extends to subjects of *seem*-type verbs with SPs. **Goals and analysis.** This talk has three goals: **i)** further consolidate, through a generative typology investigation, another rarely investigated DOM split; if in *all* 40 (genetically unrelated) SP-permitting languages investigated under the current project shared (indefinite) arguments can *only* be interpreted as *specific*, and must be marked differentially with SPs (when corresponding morphology is present in the language), specificity/DOM is not always required in other non-finite/small clause environments (i.e., infinitives, gerunds, subjunctives); **ii)** provide further support, through a variety of (novel) diagnostics (pseudo-gapping, adverb placement, floated quantifiers stranding, scopal interactions, multiple agreement spreading, etc.) for an analysis in which the shared argument (i.e., the DOM-ed object) is interpreted in an intermediate position *higher* than V but lower than *v* (Lasnik 1999, Frey 2001, López 2012); **iii)** further propose that this intermediate position is a (low) *evidential* projection, required for the (syntactic) composition of cognitive and evaluative predicates like *consider* and *seem*; the “shared argument” is *merged* as a specifier of this evidential head. Initial merge in this intermediate evidential position: a) makes more specific the semantic processes applying in this position (‘choice function’ etc.); b) can further predict the presence of overt evidential marking (as preliminarily noticed in some languages), as well as the expected (high) scopal interaction with other quantifiers. The conclusion is that one of the sources of specificity is the presence of an evidential head; the vast literature on (high) evidentials has reinforced several times the observation that these heads prefer to take widest scope and only allow arguments under their scope to be interpreted as ‘specific’ (Cinque 2000, Speas 2004, 2011, etc.). The current account also provides strong support for DOM analyses (e.g. López 2012) which require both syntactic conditions (a position above V) and semantic principles to derive specificity and differential marking. Moreover, it avoids the problems canonical scrambling accounts have. **Scrambling.** Under a scrambling analysis (which would derive specificity by assuming movement from an embedded clause, see Diesing 1992, de Hoop 1996, López 2012), the restriction on specific readings with SPs is mysterious, given the existence of weak/narrow scope interpretations of indefinite shared arguments (and quantifiers, more generally) with infinitives (2a vs. 2b); such weak readings are normally obtained via a process of *quantifier lowering/reconstruction* (May 1985, Chomsky 1995, Boeckx 2001, Fox 2000, etc.); reconstruction makes available for interpretation the (relevant portion of) shared argument in its initial position in the embedded clause. The problem is that one can’t simply block narrow scope readings with SPs by saying that small clauses are not domains of quantification. Williams (1983), and more recently Moulton (2012) have shown that quantification is possible inside the small clause (2c and 2d). The sentence in (2d) contains an (unaccusative) modal adjective, which initially introduces the shared argument as its complement (Zimmerman 1995, Cinque 1995, etc.). Examples like (2d) further suggest that the lack of narrow scope cannot be due to interactions with the degree component in adjectives (Matushansky 2002), as all scalar adjectives would be expected to behave uniformly. Lastly, that the specificity effects are obtained with stage-level predicates (‘happy’, etc.) also shows that they are not the result of individual level structure (Diesing 1992, Basilico 2003, etc.). In turn, assuming that specificity readings must be connected to *strong Case* assignment (de Hoop 1996) leaves examples like the Finnish in (6) unexplained – what Finnish shows is a mismatch between the morphology of a weak Case (the partitive, which does not normally signal specificity with apparently atelic predicates) and an obligatory specific interpretation. **Mixed accounts.** Mixed accounts, in which scrambling places the shared argument in a position where a semantic operation (‘choice function’) can further apply (e.g., López 2012) are equally problematic in that

